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Abstract: This paper analyses the issue of the dynamics of the TARGET2 system balances 
during the sovereign debt crisis, when some countries registered a decisive inflow of the 
central bank liquidity and others showed an outflow. The dynamics in the TARGET2 are 
here explained as being due to a fall in the level of confidence in the capacity of the 
Economic and Monetary Union to survive, rather than to disparities in the level of 
competitiveness among countries of the Eurozone. This crisis of confidence has to be 
considered as the consequence of the implicit refusal of the European institutions to create 
a mechanism working as lender of last resort for the euro area member States; indeed, only 
when the ECB took this responsibility by launching the Outright Monetary Transactions 
clear signs of improvement were observed in the sovereign debt crisis. 
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1. Introduction 
This paper analyses the evolution of TARGET2 1 balances during the sovereign debt crisis in the 
Euro area. Our investigation stresses that the TARGET2 dynamics can be considered a direct 
                                                 
1 TARGET stands for Trans-European Automated Real-time Gross settlement Express Transfer system. 
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consequence of specific political choices made by European institutions, rather than linked to 
competitiveness disparities across Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) member States. More 
specifically, they appear to be related to a certain reluctance of European institutions in setting up a 
“lender of last resort” mechanism in order to provide those member States in need with financial 
support. TARGET2 system is the infrastructure that allows the settling of payments related to financial 
institution transactions and to the monetary policy operations within the EMU. This system, 
essentially, allows for the central bank liquidity to circulate among national central banks of the Euro 
area, and registers the inflow and outflow of the central bank liquidity for each of these countries. 2 
TARGET2 balances values were negligible until August 2007, when some member States started 
observing substantial central bank liquidity inflow while some others experienced decisive outflow.  
In this paper, countries showing cumulated claims in the TARGET2 balances at the end of 2012 will 
be identified as core countries, within which a prominent position is occupied by Germany for the 
absolute size of its balance; while countries showing cumulated liabilities will be identified as 
peripheral countries, among which there are Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain, countries under 
financial support programmes promoted by European institutions, and Italy (Figure 1). 3 
 
Figure 1. TARGET2 balances towards the Eurosystem, EMU-12 member States (Euro 
billion, yearly, end of the period). Source: Elaboration on the “Institute of Empirical 
Economic Research—Osnabrück University” dataset (accessed on 25 June 2015, 
http://www.eurocrisismonitor.com/). 
The determinants of the TARGET2 balances were extensively explored in the literature, and two 
main positions emerged. 
The first, to which we refer as the core interpretation argued that the TARGET2 balances  
reflected the disparities in the level of competitiveness across the EMU member States (Sinn and 
Wollmershäuser [3–5], see also Cesaratto [6]). More specifically, while in the core countries, a 
                                                 
2 See European Central Bank [1]. 
3 For a comprehensive analysis of the issues raised by the dynamics of TARGET2 balances, see Cour-Thimann [2]. 
-400
-200
0
200
400
600
800
2010 2011
2012 2013
2014
Int. J. Financial Stud. 2015, 3 484 
 
 
sustainable fiscal policy was coupled with structural reforms aimed at increasing the degree of 
competitiveness both in the labour and in the goods markets, the peripheral countries limited their 
action to support domestic demand: the private component through a reckless credit policy and the 
public component through an unsustainable fiscal policy. As a result, a gap in levels of 
competitiveness between the two groups of countries has been growing, with the core countries 
accumulating surpluses in the current account of the Balance of Payments (BoP) and the peripheral 
countries accumulating deficits. Until 2007, capital flows from the core countries financed the BoP 
deficits in the peripheral countries; with the incoming of the crisis, an increase in the country risk due 
to a re-evaluation of the economic fundamentals in the peripheral countries negatively affected the 
access to financial markets both for their governments and financial institutions, causing a capital flow 
reversal toward the core countries. The non-standard measures of monetary policy implemented by the 
European Central Bank (ECB) delayed the essential prices adjustment, in particular that of the wage 
rate and of the interest rate, and continued to feed the deficit of the public sector budget and of the BoP 
current account. Ultimately, TARGET2 imbalances reflected the outflow from the peripheral countries 
of those financial resources provided to the bank sector through the non-standard monetary policy 
measures. 4 As far as the economic policy recommendations are concerned, the “core interpretation” 
suggests two main routes: austerity policies and structural reforms. The first one consists of a 
restrictive fiscal and monetary policy: the resulting economic slowdown would have promoted an 
increase in the level of competitiveness of peripheral countries by determining a wage rate contraction, 
while the rise in the interest rate connected with the restrictive monetary policy would have supported 
the access to financial markets by encouraging the inflow of financial capital from abroad. The second 
one consists of an industrial policy aimed to raise the degree of competitiveness in service and good 
markets and the degree of flexibility in the labour market; therefore, also in the long run, the level of 
competitiveness of peripheral countries would have been strengthened through the adoption of the 
structural reforms. 
The second position, which we called the peripheral interpretation, argued that the TARGET2 
balances reflected the high strains in the financial markets, mainly attributable to a lower confidence in 
the ability of the European institutions to face the sovereign debt crisis (Panico and Purificato [7],  
ECB [8–10], De Grauwe and Ji [11], Deutsche Bundesbank [12], Lavoie [13]). What has been 
observed was a sort of overshooting in sovereign bonds’ yields of the peripheral countries: regardless 
of the economic fundamentals and the alleged divergence in the level of competitiveness between 
EMU member States, financial markets incorporated in the price system and, in particular, in sovereign 
bonds’ yields, the expectation of a return for the peripheral countries to the respective national 
currencies with a corresponding devaluation. The fear that the euro and EMU could be just one step 
away from the collapse was real, since Mario Draghi, the President of the ECB, on 26 July 2012 
considered it worth declaring: “When people talk about the fragility of the euro and the increasing 
fragility of the euro, and perhaps the crisis of the euro, very often non-euro area member states or 
                                                 
4 Notice here that there were also financial support programs promoted by the Council of the European Union in favour 
of the governments of Greece, Ireland and Portugal, which were beneficiaries of economic and financial adjustment 
programmes, and Spain, which agreed for a banking recapitalization and restructuring programme. Nevertheless, we 
focus on the support provided by the ECB to credit institutions because it was surely more relevant according to its 
economic size. 
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leaders, underestimate the amount of political capital that is being invested in the euro. And so we 
view this, and I do not think we are unbiased observers, we think the euro is irreversible” (ECB [14]). 
Confirming this position a couple of weeks later, the ECB [15] (p. 5) stressed: “Exceptionally high risk 
premia are observed in government bond prices in several countries and financial fragmentation 
hinders the effective working of monetary policy. Risk premia that are related to fears of the 
reversibility of the euro are unacceptable, and they need to be addressed in a fundamental manner. The 
euro is irreversible”. At the beginning, the crisis arose in sovereign bond markets and it spread 
subsequently to the interbank market: investors started short-selling their peripheral government 
bonds, by determining an increase in interest rates and a decrease in prices; after that, peripheral credit 
institutions were precluded from accessing the interbank market, namely, loans previously granted by 
other financial institutions were rejected in order to avoid risks of potential losses arising from their 
exposure to sovereign securities; therefore, the TARGET2 balances can be considered as reflecting the 
central bank liquidity outflow related to the financial turmoil in sovereign bond markets and the 
interbank market. As far as the economic policy suggestions are concerned, the peripheral 
interpretation strongly defends the ECB monetary policy choices; indeed, the non-standard measures 
allowed the banking sector of the peripheral countries to face with the central bank liquidity outflow 
and to avoid that a liquidity crisis moved towards a solvency crisis. 5 
The core and peripheral interpretation hold differing views with respect to both the determinants of 
TARGET2 imbalances and the economic policy recommendations; therefore, the analysis of the 
TARGET2 balances is directly relevant to identify an appropriate economic policy to face the 
sovereign debt crisis in the EMU. 
As for the empirical perspective, the literature did not express a unique position on the determinants 
of TARGET2 balances. The statistical analysis by Cecioni and Ferrero [18] showed a correlation 
between TARGET2 imbalances and BoP financial account imbalances, where the latter stemmed from 
the reallocation of financial assets, as carried out by financial institutions, towards the core countries; 
otherwise, current account deficits did not provide any explanation for the growing in TARGET2 
imbalances, albeit a certain correlation between TARGET2 and current account balances only emerged 
for Greece in the period preceding the sovereign debt crisis. 6 The econometric analysis by De Grauwe 
and Ji [11] highlighted the negative and significant impact of the peripheral government bonds’ yields 
on the TARGET2 imbalances, with the first variable taken as an indicator of the crisis of confidence in 
the capacity of European institutions to survive; moreover, the authors also showed the cumulated 
values of the BoP current account deficits not to be correlated with TARGET2 balances. Nevertheless, 
it is worth stressing that these findings should not be interpreted as a causal link in which the yields are 
the determinant and the TARGET2 balances the effect: it is also reasonable to think of the increase in 
sovereign bonds’ yields as a result of the central bank liquidity outflow, that is, of the TARGET2 
balances. According to Auer [19], the econometric analysis shows how the evolution of TARGET2 
imbalances and of the BoP current account imbalances are not correlated until August 2007, while a 
strong correlation emerged successively; the author stressed that this result should be interpreted with 
caution as it simply implies that, during the financial crisis, the current account deficits were 
                                                 
5 See Bindseil and König [16], De Grauwe and Ji [11], Whelan [17]; but also the contribution of ECB [8] (pp. 35–40),  
[9] (pp. 8–10), [10] (pp. 103–114) and Deutsche Bundesbank [12] (pp. 34–35). 
6 See also Bindseil and König [16], Whelan [17]. 
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increasingly funded through the non-standard monetary policy measures, rather than through private 
capital inflows. Regarding the reasons behind this, no evidence is provided to support either a  
re-evaluation of the risk connected to disparities in the level of competitiveness among countries or a 
confidence crisis in the capacity of the EMU to survive; therefore, the empirical analysis does not 
appear decisive in settling the question of what affects the TARGET2 balances. As argued in Sinn and 
Wollmershäuser [4], the persistent deficits in BoP current account accumulated before the crisis have 
favoured the growing of financial liabilities towards foreign creditors, so that the correlation between 
TARGET2 balances and financial account balance observed during the sovereign debt crisis could 
simply reflect the decision of the foreign creditors to short-sell the financial assets hold in the 
peripheral countries due to an increase in the country risk following the worsening of the economic 
fundamental. At the same time, the financial resources provided through the non-standard monetary 
policy measures created the possibility for the peripheral countries to honour the debts incurred in 
previous years (Merler and Pisany-Ferry [20]). 
This paper aims to provide some elements that contribute to shed light on the dynamics of the 
TARGET2 balances. First, before the financial crisis, the peripheral countries presented various degree 
of heterogeneity when compared trough different macro indicators of internal and external 
performance. Within a rather complex picture emerges that some peripheral countries showed 
soundness in fiscal policies, respecting the Maastricht criteria, as in the cases of Ireland and Spain; 
some others especially Ireland, as well as Italy, did not present competitiveness challenges, as it is 
reflected by the positive value of their trade balance. The International Investment Positions (IIPs), 
however negative, in the case of Spain and Italy, were compensated by a balanced distribution of the 
sovereign debt between residents and non-residents that limited their external exposure, whereas the 
government bond shares remaining in the hand of the Irish and the Greek residents were extremely 
small. Second, a relevant portion of the central bank liquidity outflow from the peripheral countries 
occurred when the European institutions took some specific policy decisions, and not when disparities 
in the levels of competitiveness of individual countries emerged: these decisions resulted in the 
implicit refusal to establish a mechanism which would have acted as lender of last resort in favour of 
the governments of the peripheral countries. This process led to a severe deterioration in the 
expectations regarding the solvency of the EMU member States as well as the risk linked to their 
possible partial or total default; as a result, the fall in the confidence in the ability of EMU to survive 
induced severe strains on the financial markets. Third, as argued in the literature, fiscal consolidation 
and real depreciation tend to destabilize an economic system when it is in a negative conjuncture and it 
is coupled with a monetary policy ineffective in reducing the rate of interest: this logical framework is 
exactly the one experienced by the peripheral countries. Thus, in deciding and implementing its 
monetary policy, the ECB held its legitimate and unavoidable role of lender of last resort in order to 
avoid a liquidity crisis for the credit institutions, while the lack of a European institution that took on 
the same responsibility toward the member States resulted in the escalation of the debt crisis. The 
sovereign debt crisis in the Eurozone showed signs of reversal only when the ECB satisfied the 
inevitable need to implicitly assume, so far credibly and under specific conditions, the role of lender of 
last resort for the EMU member States. 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 briefly defines the features of a lender of 
last resort and how the ECB decides and implements the monetary policy; moreover, it describes the 
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working mechanism of the TARGET2 system and illustrates the economical meaning of its balances.  
Section 3 offers an outline of the different dimensions of macroeconomic heterogeneity across the 
peripheral countries between 1999 and 2000 and reads the dynamic of the TARGET balances in the 
light of some key political decision adopted by European institutions. Section 4 stresses the legitimacy 
of the ECB’s monetary policy choices as pertaining to its role of lender of last resort for the credit 
institutions, and it points out how the economic context in the peripheral countries justified the need of 
a lender of last resort also in favour of EMU member States. Section 5 summarizes some conclusions. 
2. The ECB as a Lender of Last Resort and the Potential Reflections in the TARGET2 System 
The first consolidated theory for successful lending of last resort operations were described by 
Bagehot in 1873. Left unchanged, the core principles illustrated by the author, over time, the design of 
the lender of the last resort role evolved according to the necessities of the financial and economic 
system. A general definition of lender of last resort can call on one or more institutions which provide 
unlimited liquidity assistance to other institutions when an uncommon demand of liquidity arises and 
when other mechanisms are not able to face with the status quo. The intervention of a lender of last 
resort aims to ensure the stability in financial markets, to avoid the outbreak of liquidity crisis and to 
prevent them to turn into solvency crisis. 
The definition of lender of last resort encompasses several aspects among which the most prominent 
are: (a) identifying the lender institution; (b) determining the scale and the timing of the liquidity 
supply; (c) identifying the borrower institutions; (d) fixing the conditions of the lending procedure. The 
role of lender of last resort can be broader or narrower according to the interpretation given to the last 
two points. Following this scheme, in principle, the role of lender of last resort can be played by 
different actors such as national central banks, international organizations, ad hoc institutions, or 
institutions bearing other responsibilities as well (Buiter and Rahbari [21]). In the case of a central 
bank, this role can be performed along with the ones of ensuring the price and the economic stability. 
Further to this, the lender of last resort needs to be willing to use all the resources at its disposal, and it 
has to be recognized as such by the market establishing a solid reputation. The liquidity required to 
face the credit demand has to be immediate and unlimited. As far as the borrower institution is 
concerned, it can be either a financial institution, a government or both. Whether the government can 
be included or not among the potential receivers of the emergency liquidity depends on the 
interpretation given to the concepts of illiquidity and insolvency, whose frontier can be blurry in some 
cases (De Grauwe [22] (p. 528)). Further to this, it is possible to set ex ante and ex post conditions 
against which the potential borrower can actually obtain the liquidity needed. 7 
The European System of Central Banks (ESBC), that includes the ECB and the national central 
banks of European Union member States, has the principal aim of guaranteeing the price stability.  
In this view it defines and implements the monetary policy. The ESBC is directed by the ECB’s 
decision-making bodies, namely, the Governing Council and the Executive Board. The ECB function 
is to assure that the tasks assigned to the ESBC are carried out either by its own activities or by those 
                                                 
7  An example of ex ante conditionality can be the request of a specific kind of collateral, whereas ex post conditionality 
can be intended as the request of policy implementation (strengthening of the banking sector, fiscal adjustment, 
correction of excessive deficit, growth enhancing reforms). 
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of the national central banks. 8 Referring to these latter, the article 12, first paragraph, of the Statute of 
the ESCB and of the ECB states: “(…) The Executive Board shall implement monetary policy in 
accordance with the guidelines and decisions laid down by the Governing Council. In doing so the 
Executive Board shall give the necessary instructions to national central banks. (…) To the extent 
deemed possible and appropriate (…) the ECB shall have recourse to the national central banks to carry 
out operations which form part of the tasks of the ESCB”. Therefore, the ECB, as the decision-making 
body of the ESBC, decides and implements the monetary policy with the operational support of the 
national central banks of the EMU member States. These latter, together with the ECB, constitutes  
the Eurosystem. 9 
A wide part of the literature, Buiter and Rahbari [21], De Grauwe [22], Hu [24], Micossi [25], 
recognizes the ECB as acting in the role of lender of last resort during the sovereign debt crisis, 
although is debated the precise moment this role was acquired, which were the instruments used to 
carry it out and whether the ECB was acting alone or in liaison with other institutions; in our view, the 
monetary policy decided and implemented by the ECB stems from its legitimate and unavoidable role 
of lender of last resort for credit institutions to avoid liquidity crisis. 
The TARGET2 system is a settlement infrastructure that allows the smooth regulation of those 
payments linked to financial institutions transactions and monetary policy operations implemented by 
the Eurosystem, including those that can be attributable to the role of lender of last resort carried out 
by the ECB. This infrastructure connects all the Eurosystem members, with the ECB that acts as a 
clearing house for the national central banks in the countries that adopted the euro; payments are 
regulated through claims and liabilities recorded in the national central banks and imputable to the 
national financial institutions. The transactions among financial institutions belonging to different 
countries are necessarily associated with cross-country central bank liquidity transfer; otherwise, 
monetary policy operations are not related to cross-country central bank liquidity transfer because they 
are implemented by the national central banks and their domestic financial institutions. As a result, the 
TARGET2 balance, namely, the net position of each national central bank towards the ECB, gives an 
indication on the geographical redistribution of the central bank liquidity compared to the original 
distribution set up by the monetary policy operations. 
The following example describes the working mechanism of the TARGET2 system. Suppose that a 
national central bank of country A makes a payment to a central bank of country B; the national central 
banks operate on behalf of financial institutions located in the two countries that, in turns, operate on 
the request of their customers. In this case, the current account of the financial institution of country A, 
held at the national central bank of country A, is debited, while the current account of the financial 
institution of country B, held at the national central bank of country B, is credited. At the end of the 
accounting day, unless the liquidity outflow (inflow) is compensated by an opposite transaction of the 
same amount involving whatever actor of the market, excluding directly the ECB, the national central 
bank’s balance sheet of country A (country B) is accounted as having a TARGET liability (claim) 
                                                 
8 See the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union: particularly, Art. 127, first paragraph, Art. 129, first 
paragraph and Art. 282, first and second paragraphs; see also the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and 
of the European Central Bank: Art. 1, Art. 2, Art. 3, first paragraph, and Art. 9, second paragraph. 
9 See the guidelines for the implementation of monetary policy in the Euro area (ECB [23] (p. 9)). 
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towards the ECB (see Table 1). 10 Summing up, regardless of the reasons of this occurrence, the lack of 
liquidity flows of the same amount but of the opposite sign—among the countries connected to the 
TARGET2 system via their national banks—generates TARGET2 imbalances. 
Table 1. TARGET2 system and accounting balances. 
Financial Institution—Country A National Central Bank—Country A 
Assets Liabilities Assets Liabilities 
 
−Δ debits  
financial institution B 
+Δ loans  
financial institution A 
−Δ deposits  
financial institution A 
−Δ deposits  
National central bank A 
+Δ loans  
National central bank A 
 
+Δ liabilities  
TARGET2 ECB 
European Central Bank 
Assets Liabilities 
+Δ claims TARGET2  
National central bank A 
+Δ liabilities TARGET2  
National central bank B 
National Central Bank—Country B Financial Institution—Country B 
Assets Liabilities Assets Liabilities 
−Δ loans  
financial institution B 
+Δ deposits  
financial institution B 
−Δ credits  
financial institution A 
 
+Δ claim TARGET2 ECB  +Δ deposits  
National central bank B 
−Δ loans  
National central bank B 
The TARGET2 entries (claims and liabilities) trace how the central bank liquidity moves across 
EMU member States. When the TARGET2 balance against the ECB, defined as the difference 
between claim and liabilities as accounted in the balance sheet of a national central bank, is zero this 
means that central bank liquidity inflow and outflow balance out perfectly, whereas being the balance 
positive or negative this would indicate, respectively, an inflow or an outflow of central bank liquidity. 
In brief, TARGET2 balances define how the geographical distribution of the central bank liquidity 
changes with respect to the original one as it is determined by the monetary policy operations 
implemented by the Eurosystem. 
To the extent that national credit institutions can withstand an outflow of central bank liquidity by 
using the standard measures of monetary policy, TARGET2 imbalances only describe the ordinary 
working of a monetary union; otherwise, when the Eurosystem is forced to implement non-standard 
measures in order to support credit institutions, TARGET2 imbalances could indicate an increasing 
risk of a liquidity crisis for countries experiencing an outflow of central bank liquidity. 
3. The Determinants of the Dynamic of the TARGET2 Balances 
The financial crisis, culminated with the collapse of the investment bank Lehman Brothers, resulted 
in a reduction of the GDP over the years 2008–2009, the following moderate economic recovery was 
                                                 
10 In country A, transferring the monetary base to country B implies either the contraction of the previous amount of 
monetary base, if the amount of deposits held by financial institutions to the national central banks decrease, or the 
stability of monetary base if, on the contrary, the loans increase. In country B, the money transfer from country A 
implies the increase of the existing monetary base, when the amount of deposits held by the financial institutions at the 
national central bank increase, or maintaining the existing level of the monetary base, when loans diminish (see Table 1). 
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soon interrupted. The transition between the financial crisis and the sovereign debt crisis started at the 
end of 2009 when serious doubt on the accuracy of the Greek fiscal account data emerged. When, in 
spring 2010, Greece turned for help to the European Union and the International Monetary Fund, the 
attention of international investors to sovereign risk in the Euro area intensified. Rapidly, the debt 
crisis extended, for different reasons, first to Ireland (November 2010) and then to Portugal (April 
2011) asking for assistance facilities as well. A further escalation of the debt crisis occurred starting in 
July 2011 with the announcement of a plan for the restructuring of Greek sovereign debt. In this case, 
the crisis was not restricted to slight economies of Euro Area, but it also involved the economies of 
Italy and Spain, with their total GDP which amounted to 27.7 per cent of the Euro area GDP in 2011. 
The contagion was reflected in a rapid increase of the spreads between the sovereign bonds’ yield of 
the peripheral countries and of Germany. 
In the remainder of this section, first of all, we describe the main features of peripheral economies at 
the beginning of the sovereign crisis; then, we analyse the dynamic of the TARGET balances in the 
light of some key political decision adopted by European institutions. 
3.1. Macroeconomic Performance of the Peripheral Member States between the Adoption of the Euro 
and the Financial Crisis 
Before the financial crisis, the peripheral countries presented various degree of heterogeneity when 
compared trough different macro indicators. With the aim of highlighting the complex picture 
developed between the adoption of the Euro 11 and 2007, we refer to several measures of internal and 
external performance, benchmarked against Germany. More specifically, the analysis of the real 
growth and of the value added by sector allows having a first insight on the economic performance, 
whereas the debt-to-GDP ratio, along with the government deficit/surplus-to-GDP ratio, indicates the 
degree of fiscal prudence of the different member States. A breakdown of the driving components of 
the current account shows that for some peripheral countries non-trade dynamic played a crucial role. 
Further insights are provided by the analysis of the net International Investment Positions (IIPs) that, 
although mirroring the current account balance, is driven as well by price and exchange rate variations. 
Finally, a combined investigation of the IIP, the debt-to-GDP ratio and the distribution of the sovereign 
debt between residents and non-residents gives a further measure of the degree of external exposure. 
All the data referred to in this section are collected in Appendix (Table A1). 
In terms of growth performance, a glance at the average real GDP growth reveals all the peripheral 
countries experiencing a positive rate with an overall average of 3.5 per cent of GDP. Ireland enjoyed 
the highest growth average rate, 6.4 per cent, followed by Greece and Spain in the range of 4.0 per cent 
and by Portugal and Italy with 1.8 per cent and 1.5 per cent, respectively. Germany recorded an 
average real GDP growth rate of 1.6 per cent. More details derive from investigating the contribution 
to the total value added of the different sectors. 12 Ireland registered 27.0 per cent of the total in the 
industry sector followed by Germany and Italy with 26.0 and 21.0 per cent of the total, respectively. 
The construction sector saw Spain with more than 10.0 per cent of the total compared to Ireland, 
                                                 
11 1999 for 11 member States with the exception of Greece that joined in 2001. 
12 The following subsectors considered here are industry (excluding construction), construction, wholesale and retail  
trade (that includes as well transport accommodation, food and beverages), financial and insurance activities, real  
estate activities. 
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Greece and Portugal that reached between 7.0 and 8.0 percent. Wholesale and retail trade were 
particularly strong in Greece, Spain, Italy and Portugal. In all the three cases the per cent of the total 
always exceeded 20.0. In the real estate sector service Germany, Greece and Italy reached a similar 
level accounting for a portion of around 11.0 per cent of the total. For financial services, Ireland had 
the highest share of almost 9.0 per cent of the total. 
As regard as fiscal position, Ireland and Spain showed prudence in managing the government 
balance (as shown by a surplus of 1.6 and 0.2 per cent of GDP, respectively) and outperformed Italy, 
Germany and Portugal that presented negative signs. 13 In 1999, Italy, with a debt-to-GDP ratio of 
110.0 per cent, and Greece 14 were the countries not respecting the Maastricht criterion. Germany and 
Spain were slightly above the threshold, with 60.2 and 60.9 per cent of the GDP, respectively. Portugal 
and Ireland performed even better with a 51.0 and 47.0 per cent of the GDP, respectively. Over  
the period, in Ireland and in Spain the debt-to-GDP ratio reduced with an annual average of 7.8 and  
6.5 per cent, respectively. In Italy, a moderate increase was registered. Portugal and Germany showed 
an increase in the ratio of 3.2 per cent and 0.8 per cent, respectively. 
Over the same period, the Euro area maintained a roughly balanced current account with respect to 
the rest of the world, but, within the area sustained, imbalances emerged. In a monetary union, the 
increasing integration of financial markets can subsidize saving-investment imbalances and allows for 
an efficient allocation of capital, promoting, this way, the economic convergence of countries. On the 
other hand, the impossibility of using the exchange rate as a tool for correcting long-lasting  
saving-investment imbalances represents a relevant limit. To what extent the current account balances 
are of concern within a monetary union is still under careful scrutiny by the literature (Holinsky et al. [26]). 
On average over the period 1999–2007, all the peripheral member States faced a deficit in the current 
account of the BoP that ranged between 9.3 per cent of GDP in the case of Portugal to 0.5 per cent of 
GDP in the case of Italy. Conversely, Germany runs a current account surplus of 2.7 per cent of GDP. 
In determining the overall value of the current account balance, non-trade dynamics played an 
important role. In terms of composition of the current account balance, among peripheral member 
States, two groups can be distinguished. The first one includes Italy and Ireland where non-trade 
components of the current account were, in different scales, the main drivers of the overall current 
account deficit; more specifically, for Ireland the negative net income had the main role whereas in 
Italy both negative income and transfers counted. 15  The second one includes Greece, Spain and 
Portugal in which the trade components and non-trade components were both accountable for the 
overall current account deficit; as a subgroup, Greece and Portugal shared the evidence that positive 
value of net transfer and negative value of net income offset each other. The case of Ireland is 
illustrative in showing that the reason behind the small positive surplus of the current account did not 
concern its competitiveness sphere. Some favourable geographical characteristics, along with a low 
level of corporate income taxes, made Ireland an ideal location for receiving foreign direct 
investments, especially from multinational enterprises. A further decomposition of the net income, 
                                                 
13 The only available data of the series for Greece are relative to 2006 and 2007 (−6.1 per cent and −6.7 per cent 
respectively. 
14 The Eurostat time series used for all the other member States does not include data for Greece in the period we are 
considering, alternative sources as OECD and World Bank indicates a value of 103.0 per cent of the GDP. 
15 In terms of trade balance, Ireland showed a positive sign with an average value of 13.0 per cent of the GDP against the 
3.7 per cent in Germany and the 0.6 per cent in Italy. 
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confirms that repatriation of the multinational profits was the main driver of the overall value of 
income: on average, the direct investment amounted to −17.0 per cent of the GDP (with dividends and 
distributed branch profits amounting to −11.0 per cent of GDP, reinvested earnings and undistributed 
branch profits amounting to −6.0 per cent and interest on debt amounting to 0.4 per cent); portfolio 
investments were almost balanced. In Italy, the worsening in the net income position was caused by 
the widening of the gap between the value of the Italian bonds held by non-residents and the value of 
foreign equities held by Italian residents. In the lack of data for the subcategories of transfers up to 
2007 is not possible to disentangle the main drivers for this period as regards the overall level of 
transfers; however, it can be noticed that, starting in 2008, the contribution of the foreign worker’s 
remittances stays constant, whereas the current transfer by general government has an increasingly 
negative impact, mainly due to the Italy’s net contribution to the EU budget. 
The countries that accumulated current account deficits (surpluses) registered as well negative 
(positive) IIPs. During the pre-crisis period, net IIPs displayed diverging trends across countries: 
particularly, Greece, Portugal and Spain registered a rapid deterioration. Although mirroring the 
development of the current account balance, net IIP development may differ significantly from the 
current account development because of the valuation effects linked to market prices, used for 
estimating financial assets and liabilities, and to exchange rate movements. In the period 2000–2007, 
all the peripheral countries displayed negative net IIPs ranging from −60.0 per cent of the GDP in 
Greece to −8.0 per cent in Ireland; Germany, on the contrary, displayed a positive 12.0 per cent of 
GDP. The decomposition of the changes in net IIPs shows that the main driver was, in all the cases 
with the exception of Germany, the valuation effect: −5.0 per cent of the GDP for Greece, −4.5 per cent 
for Ireland, −4.0 per cent for Spain and −3.2 per cent for Italy; in Germany the valuation effect was 
slightly positive. In turn the explanations behind the valuation effects can be different depending on 
the countries considered. In the case of Ireland, the dimension of the valuation effect can be attributed 
to the large gross asset and liability position: limited price changes cause large valuation variations. In 
Greece as well as in Spain, instead, the valuation effect was linked to price variations. In the case of 
Italy, which holds a relevant portion of assets in foreign currencies, the main driver of the deterioration 
of the net IIP was explained by the appreciation of the Euro compared to the US dollar. 
An additional dimension of the heterogeneity among member States can be given by the joint 
analysis of the IIP, the government debt-to-GDP ratio and the distribution of the sovereign debt 
between resident and non-residents. High government debt-to-GDP ratios are of a major concern when 
held by non-residents; in this case, both the expenditure for servicing the debt increases and the tax 
revenue on interest shrinks, and this condition is aggravated when combined with negative net IIPs. It 
worth recalling that in terms of debt-to-GDP ratio and on average in the 1999–2007 period Italy and 
Greece were above 100.0 per cent, Germany and Portugal in the vicinity of 60.0 per cent, Spain at  
48.0 per cent and Ireland at 31.0 per cent. As regard as the distribution of the sovereign bonds between 
resident and non-residents, in 1999, Greece, Spain and Italy, had a share of debt hold by residents in a 
range between 66.0 per cent (Greece) and 69.0 per cent (Spain), while Portugal and Ireland saw a share 
of 45.0 per cent. 16 In 2007, the picture completely changed with Greece and Portugal residents owing, 
respectively, 29.0 per cent and 24.0 per cent of the total sovereign debt and for Ireland the quota was 
                                                 
16 The first available data for Ireland and Portugal date back respectively to 2000 and 2001. 
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only 10.0 per cent; the situation in Italy and Spain was more stable with a share of 50.0 per cent in both 
cases. These data cross-referenced with those of the external position give further hints about the 
vulnerability of a country: the position of Italy, for example, was not particularly challenging because 
of the limited negative IIP and the balanced share of debt between residents and non-residents. 
The picture sketched so far shows that, in the period 1999–2007, among peripheral countries, some 
respected the Maastricht criterion of the debt-to-GDP ratio (as in the case of Ireland and Portugal) 
exhibiting, as well, prudency in fiscal policy (as in the of Ireland and Spain). Ireland and, to a lesser 
extent, Italy did not presented competitiveness challenges, as it is reflected by the positive value of 
their trade balance, whereas non-trade components are the main drivers of the negative net values of 
their current accounts. The net IIP in 1999 was extremely positive in Ireland and slightly negative in 
Italy. The situation deteriorated for all the peripheral member States that, to different extent, registered 
negative values in 2007. In the group, the worse fall in the IIP, in 2007, was registered by Ireland, 
whereas Italy’s loss was moderate. Furthermore, the IIPs, however negative, in the case of Spain  
and Italy, were compensated by a balanced distribution of the sovereign debt between residents and 
non-residents that limited their external exposure, whereas the government bonds remaining in the 
hand of Irish and Greek residents was extremely small. 
3.2. Political Decisions and the TARGET2 Imbalances 
Within the peripheral interpretation, TARGET2 imbalances reflected a decisive fall in the level of 
confidence towards the ability of European institutions to face with the sovereign debt crisis. In line 
with this position, it can be argued that the dynamic of TARGET2 imbalances was closely related to 
the pattern followed by European institutions in taking certain key political decisions. Indeed, the 
TARGET2 imbalances revealed a tendency of accumulating before and after those choices that proved 
decisive in influencing the perceptions of the level of cohesion shown by European institutions in 
facing the crisis. 
In Greece and Ireland, the TARGET2 liabilities accumulated rapidly in the months preceding the 
request for financial support to European institutions and the launch of the economic and financial 
adjustment programmes, in May and December of 2010, respectively. In Greece, which registered its 
maximum of cumulated liabilities in November 2011, amounting to 109.3 billion euro, the 38.1 per cent 
of the total amount was accumulated between November 2009 and April 2010 (Figure 2). Ireland’s total 
TARGET2 liabilities reached their peak at 145.2 billion euro in December 2010 and 56.7 per cent of  
this amount was accumulated from August 2010 to November 2010 (Figure 3). In Portugal, 47.1 percent 
of the maximum liabilities of 74.5 billion euro (March 2012) was accumulated between April and  
July 2010, one year before the request for financial support (Figure 4). 
The outflow of financial resources from these countries could be considered as a result of the 
uncertainty about the sustainability of public finances, albeit the reasons for the uncertainty differed 
across countries: in Greece, the size of the public sector budget deficit, hidden thanks to accounting 
artifices; in Ireland, the magnitude of the financial support the government guaranteed to the banking 
sector; in Portugal, the extension of the public sector overloaded by inefficient companies. 
Nevertheless, it can also be argued that financial markets were plagued primarily by the doubts about 
the ability of European institutions to be sufficiently cohesive in planning and deciding for an effective 
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stabilizing economic policy; indeed, in Greece and Portugal, the TARGET2 liabilities did not begin to 
reduce when the adjustment programmes were launched. 17 
 
Figure 2. TARGET2 balances towards the Eurosystem, Greece (Euro billion, monthly,  
end of the period). Source: Elaboration on the “Institute of Empirical Economic 
Research—Osnabrück University” dataset (accessed on 25 June 2015, http://www.eurocrisis 
monitor.com/). 
 
Figure 3. TARGET2 balances towards the Eurosystem, Ireland (Euro billion, monthly, end 
of the period). Source: Elaboration on the “Institute of Empirical Economic  
Research—Osnabrück University” dataset (accessed on 25 June 2015, http://www. 
eurocrisismonitor.com/). 
                                                 
17 European institutions and the IMF launched the first and second adjustment programme for Greece in May 2010 and 
March 2012, respectively; until June 2012, the total disbursements were about 150.0 billion euro, while TARGET2 
liabilities increased from 82.6 billion euro in April 2010 to 106.0 in June 2012. In Portugal, the TARGET2 liabilities 
did not change significantly during the programme, while in Ireland they began to decline after the programme  
was approved. 
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Figure 4. TARGET2 balances towards the Eurosystem, Portugal (Euro billion, monthly, 
end of the period). Source: Elaboration on the “Institute of Empirical Economic  
Research—Osnabrück University” dataset (accessed on 25 June 2015, http://www. 
eurocrisismonitor.com/). 
A close examination on how TARGET2 balances evolved in Italy and Spain further supports the 
view that financial markets were mainly plagued by the above-mentioned doubt regarding the ability 
of European institutions to face with the sovereign crisis. In both Italy and Spain, the surge in 
cumulated liabilities started in July 2011 and lasted until August 2012, when TARGET2 liabilities 
reached their peak with values of 289.3 and 434.4 billion euro, respectively. These values were 
substantially higher than those of other countries (Figures 5 and 6). In Italy, the surge was more intense 
during the first seven months, while in Spain it occurred in the last seven months: in these periods, 
61.5 per cent and 57.7 per cent of the peak value was accumulated, respectively; furthermore, in 
February 2012, a strong monthly increase of 76.3 billion euro in Italy and 64.6 billion in Spain was 
registered. Starting from August 2012, the cumulative TARGET2 liabilities decrease in both countries: 
in Italy the contraction was of 80.4 billion euro, with a cumulative value equal to 208.9 in December 
2014; in Spain it was of 244.5 billion euro, with a cumulative value of 189.9 in December 2014. 18 
The analysis just presented allows us to identify three key moments within the evolution of the 
TARGET2 balances: July 2011, February–March 2012 and July–September 2012. Each of them 
represents a block in the political and economic architecture that the European institutions have been 
designing in order to face with the sovereign debt crisis. 
                                                 
18 Also Spain was a country under programme: European institutions launched the recapitalization programme for the 
banking sector in June 2012, but the disbursements took place between December 2012 and February 2013 (about  
41.0 billion euro). 
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Figure 5. TARGET2 balances towards the Eurosystem, Spain (Euro billion, monthly, end 
of the period). Source: Elaboration on the “Institute of Empirical Economic  
Research—Osnabrück University” dataset (accessed on 25 June 2015, http://www. 
eurocrisismonitor.com/). 
 
Figure 6. TARGET2 balances towards the Eurosystem, Italy (Euro billion, monthly,  
end of the period). Source: Elaboration on the “Institute of Empirical Economic 
Research—Osnabrück University” dataset (accessed on 25 June 2015, http://www. 
eurocrisismonitor.com/). 
On July 21, 2011, the heads of State and Government of the Euro area and of the EU institutions 
expressed their support for the voluntary involvement of the private sector, and in particular of credit 
institutions, in the second financial and economic adjustment programme for Greece. The contribution 
of the private sector was estimated at a total amount of 106.0 billion euro for the period 2011–2019 
(Council of the European Union [27]). In February 2012, the voluntary involvement of the private 
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sector took the form of an official agreement: the Private Sector Involvement (PSI). Based on the PSI, 
private investors accepted to write off 53.5 per cent of the face value of the Greek government bonds 
they held. The above-mentioned declaration showed the inadequacy of the first adjustment programme 
to stabilize the Greek economy and, consequently, the impossibility for the Greek Government to 
honour its sovereign signature. Despite the voluntary nature of the agreement, indeed, its acceptance 
implied a partial Greek default. The same conclusion can be also reached by the fact that, within  
the same declaration, the heads of State and Government reiterated their commitment to honour  
the sovereign signature and stressed that the solution adopted for the case of Greece constituted  
an exception. 
The then-president of the ECB, Jean Claude Trichet, during the press conferences held for the 
monthly meeting of the Governing Council regarding monetary policy, repeatedly warned about the 
possible consequences of a partial default by Greece. Such an event would have fuelled a considerable 
volatility in the financial markets rather than concur to stabilize the Greek economy (ECB [28–29]).  
A year later, the analysis conducted by the ECB confirmed the concerns of its former president.  
July 2011 represented a turning point for the sovereign debt crisis: tensions in the bond and interbank 
markets intensified resulting both in a decrease in the efficiency of the transmission mechanism of the 
monetary policy and in a reduction of the credit in favour of families and enterprises (ECB [30] (p. 59)). 
On March 30, 2012, the Eurogroup 19 set the overall lending capacity of the European Financial 
Stability Facility (EFSF) 20  and the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) at 700.0 billion euro 
(Eurogroup [31]). This decision can be considered as the final step in the reforming process launched 
by the European institutions to prevent and manage instability situations of states within the EMU. 
The first element of this process was indubitably represented by the treaty establishing the ESM, 
signed on February 2, 2012 by the EMU member States. The ESM is an intergovernmental institution 
with the task of managing financial support programmes in favour of the government of the Euro area 
countries; in order to finance these support programmes, this institution can issue debt instruments; 
with these characteristics, the ESM represents a permanent crisis resolution mechanism for the Euro 
area. The second element was the “Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic 
and Monetary Union”, signed on March 2, 2012 by the Heads of State and Government of all 
European Union member States. 21 This Treaty, among other things, laid down that: (a) the structural 
budget deficit in public administration, adjusted for the business cycle, must not exceed 0.5 per cent of 
GDP expressed at market prices, with the obligation to incorporate this budget rule into the national 
legislation, preferably at the level of constitutional law (Article 3, paragraph one and two); (b) the 
contracting parties had to reduce by one twentieth per year their rate of general government debt-to-GDP 
ratio when it exceeded the reference value of 60.0 per cent (Article 4). The third element was the 
approval, in November 2011, by the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union, of 
                                                 
19 The Eurogroup is an informal body which members are the Ministers of Economy from each of the countries belonging 
to the EMU and a chairman; its meetings are also attended by the European Commissioner for Economic and Financial 
Affairs and by the President of ECB. The Eurogroup’s main task is to coordinate the economic policies implemented by 
countries in the Euro area. 
20 The EFSF is a “société anonyme”, under Luxembourgish law, which is a special vehicle with the task of raising funds 
through the issuance of bonds backed by the States belonging to the EMU. The funds are, then, used to implement 
support programmes. 
21 With the exception of the United Kingdom and Czech Republic. 
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the new regulations pertaining the procedures and sanctions aimed at preventing and correcting the 
macroeconomic imbalances, in general, and the excessive deficit of the structural budget of public 
administration, in particular. 22 
The fiscal consolidation and the austerity policy have been the guiding principles of the whole 
process of reform. However, just when the European institutions accomplished this process, tensions in 
the financial markets showed a marked deterioration, as suggested by the evolution of the TARGET2 
balances. 23  From our point of view, the reason for the renewed pressure lies in the fact that  
the markets evaluated the resources allocated through the EFSF and the ESM as insufficient: of the 
700.0 billion euro allocated, roughly 188.4 were already committed to Greece, Ireland and Portugal, 
while, in March 2012, the public debt of Italy and Spain alone amounted to over 2560.0 billion euro, 
rendering any support to these countries problematic in case they had requested access to a program of 
financial support. Within the picture just described, the decision to set the total lending capacity of the 
EFSF and the ESM to 700.0 billion euro was not a credible reassurance for those who assumed that the 
EMU might not have survived the crisis. In this regard, it is worth noting that, in signing the Treaty 
which established the ESM, Euro area States reiterated that the assessment of lending capacity adapted 
to the needs would have to be carried out by March 2012 (Council of the European Union [32]). The 
fact that this assessment was not completed until the 30th of March suggests a certain reluctance by the 
various states to commit resources to financial aid programmes. 
On August 2, 2012, during the press conference following the Governing Council meeting 
dedicated to monetary policy decisions, Mario Draghi, the President of the ECB, outlined the 
underlying principles of Outright Monetary Transactions (OMTs). The OMTs defined a new sovereign 
bond-buying programme designed to replace the Securities Market Program (SMP) 24 in force since 
May 10, 2010 (ECB [33]). Just a few days before, President Draghi (ECB [14]) claimed: “Within our 
mandate, the ECB is ready to do whatever it takes to preserve the euro. And believe me, it will  
be enough”. 
On September 6, 2012 the technical aspects of the programme were further explained at the press 
conference (ECB [34]). The programme has been designed to eliminate price distortions in the 
sovereign bond market due to the non-acceptable hypothesis of a return to national currencies. This 
aim was pursued by setting up an unlimited buying capacity of one to three year bonds to be held upon 
maturity. Countries eligible for the OMTs, namely, the ones which can issue these bonds, should first 
have participated in a support programme through the EFSF or the ESM, and should have fulfilled the 
conditions required by these programmes. Furthermore, the ECB had full discretion for activating, 
                                                 
22 The new framework is based on five regulations and one directive, hence the name “The Six Pack”. The Regulations n. 
1175/2011, n. 1177/2011 and n. 1173/2011, respectively, defined the procedures to prevent and correct the occurrence 
of excessive deficit in the structural balance of public administration, as well as the penalties for not complying with the 
same procedures. Regulations n. 1176 and n. 1174 defined the procedures and sanctions related to the prevention and 
correction of macroeconomic imbalances that can lead to instability in European Union economies. Finally, the 
Directive n. 2011/85/EU defined the requirements and penalties relating to the proper preparation of the public 
administration budget and the independence of national statistical institutes. 
23 The statistical analysis conducted in Sinn and Wollmershäuser [5] confirms this occurrence, but they attribute it mainly 
to the second extraordinary refinancing operation carried out by the ECB. However, it should be stressed that during 
this month the macroeconomic framework of the two countries does not change and, thus, it is difficult to motivate the 
outflow of capital solely on difference between levels of competitiveness. 
24 The SMP was the first sovereign bonds buying programme on the secondary market launched by the ECB on  
10 May 2010. 
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continuing or discontinuing the programme for any specific country and, consistent with pursuing the 
price stability, sterilized any liquidity injected through the OMTs. 
Compared with the SMP, the OMTs made, on the one hand, the conditionality principle more 
stringent, as only those countries that were able to effectively implement the interventions required by 
the financial support programme would have benefited from the ECB support on the secondary market. 
On the other hand, the OMTs created the preconditions for a more decisive and efficient ECB 
intervention, as only a recovery in price distortions should have represented a sufficient reason to stop 
purchasing bonds on the secondary market. By identifying the eligible countries and setting up an 
unlimited buying capacity, the OMTs solved the inconsistencies and ambiguities of the SMP, which 
did not clearly define these elements. 
Through the introduction of the OMTs, the ECB recognised that the diligent implementation of 
austerity measures was not a sufficient condition to preserve the access to financial markets for 
countries under programme, and it ensured adequate liquidity in the secondary market of sovereign 
bonds: whatever negative impact the austerity measures implied for the economy, the ECB cleared 
away all doubts about a new partial default regarding an EMU country. A new “Greek case” would not 
have occurred. Formally, the ECB assumed the role of buyer of last resort in favour of sovereign bond 
holders, particularly credit institutions; however, in concrete terms, it assured the solvency of each 
EMU countries under programme, that is, it assumed the role of lender of last resort in favour of national 
governments. 25  As a result, albeit the OMTs were never implemented, the ECB succeeded in 
stabilizing the sovereign bonds’ price; since sovereign bonds are the main collateral used by credit 
institutions to access to the interbank market and refinancing operations of the Eurosystem, the 
banking sectors of all peripheral countries were able to satisfy their liquidity needs on better terms and 
the efficiency of the transmission mechanism of the monetary policy improved significantly. 
4. The Need of a Lender of Last Resort 
As seen in Section 2, the ECB decides and implements the monetary policy with the operational 
support of the national central banks of the EMU member States. Despite the clarity of the legislative 
provisions on how the responsibilities for taking and implementing the monetary policy decisions are 
allocated, some claims by Sinn and Wollmershäuser [5] (p. 478) seem to be ambiguous and 
misleading: “The base money flowing out of the GIIPS via international transactions was thus 
completely offset by the creation of new base money by the GIIPS NCBs. The central bank liquidity in 
the GIIPS, (…) consists of one component that arose from asset purchases, and another that resulted 
from net refinancing operations of the central banks with the commercial banks. However, in other 
Euro core countries, particularly Germany (…) there is in addition outside money that flowed in via 
the Target accounts. The central banks of these countries had to create this central bank money on 
behalf of the central banks of the GIIPS in order to fulfil their transfer orders”. From these statements 
it appears that the national central banks of the peripheral countries decide autonomously to create and 
transfer the central bank liquidity toward core countries in order to satisfy the necessities of their 
                                                 
25 However, as an anonymous referee has stressed, the ECB never claimed that with introducing the OMTs a role of lender 
of last resort for the governments of peripheral countries could be played. 
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financial institutions. 26 On the contrary, national central banks actions essentially consist of legal 
obligations stemming from the measures of monetary policy decided and implemented by the ECB in 
its role of decision-making body of the ESBC. National central banks have to run the central bank 
liquidity transfer according to the requests made by credit institutions, as long as these institutions 
have the necessary resources and respect the necessary conditions, namely, in the context of the 
sovereign debt crisis, as long as the financial institutions can access the refinancing operations 
implemented by the Eurosystem. This is true even in the presence of the operations of Emergency 
Liquidity Assistance (ELA), which, while not having to be explicitly authorized by the Executive 
Board of the ECB, can be removed if some specific conditions arise (see Buiter et al. [35]). It can be 
noticed that the TARGET2 balances do not change when the Eurosystem implements refinancing 
operations because national central banks directly provide liquidity to their national credit institutions, 
they only change when these institutions use central bank liquidity for transnational payments. Thus, 
TARGET2 imbalances usually denote how the geographical distribution of the central bank liquidity 
differs compared to the original one as it is determined by refinancing operations, namely, they denote 
the ordinary working of a monetary union. Nevertheless, TARGET2 imbalances can also indicate that 
the Eurosystem is assuming the role of lender of last resort in favour of credit institutions when they 
reflect the implementation of the non-standard measures of monetary policy. 
Given the impossibility for the national central banks to take autonomous decisions, the main 
discussion regards the choices the ECB took towards the financial institutions of the Euro area via the 
non-standard monetary policy measures. According to the core interpretation, in order to support 
peripheral countries, the ECB was keeping the rate of interest for the refinancing operations artificially 
low, by crowding out private investors that would have been available for lending financial resources 
at a higher interest rate. In turn, a higher interest rate should have forced a reduction in the production 
and in the price level; in particular, the wage rate would have decreased, giving to the peripheral 
countries the opportunity to gain competitiveness on international markets. These conclusions are 
based on the crucial hypothesis that the price system accurately reflects the economic fundamentals of 
each country. 
Nevertheless, it is more plausible to assume that the ECB’s strategy did not endorsed these 
conclusions, but it reflected the conviction that the price system was not adequately performing its 
role, as it is incorporating the politically unacceptable expectation of an EMU break up or, at least, of 
the return to the national currency of some EMU member States. The reading of the dynamics 
observed in TARGET2 balances, as described in the previous section, provides a clear support for this 
interpretation. The distortion recorded in the price system and its inability to depict the actual situation 
of the economic fundamentals, required, in the first place, the ECB to broadly interpret its role of 
lender of last resort in favour of credit institutions and, secondly, to threaten, so far so credible, to 
implicitly assume the same role for the benefit of the member States of the EMU. From the July 22, 
2011 to August 3, 2012, the total assets of the Eurosystem increased by more than 1000.0 billion euro; 
in this period, the ECB undertook additional non-standard monetary policy measures, in particular, on 
the 21 December 2011 and 29 February 2012, two longer-term refinancing operations with a maturity 
                                                 
26 Actually, the already mentioned authors are perfectly aware of the regulatory environment in which the monetary policy 
is decided and implemented, see Sinn and Wollmershäuser [5] (p. 487). 
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of three years took place providing 1018.7 billion euro to the EMU banking sector. However, since 
August 2012, when the ECB implicitly assumed the role of lender of last resort in favour of the EMU 
member States by announcing the launch of the OMTs, the total assets began to decrease (Figure 7). 
 
Figure 7. Consolidated financial statement of the Eurosystem (Euro billion, weekly, end of 
the period) Source: Elaboration on the ECB dataset (accessed on 27 June 2015, 
http://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/browse.do?node=bbn129). 
In the light of these considerations, ascertaining who is responsible for paying back the TARGET2 
claims accumulated by the central banks of the core countries becomes a mere theoretical exercise, 
which, although interesting, does nothing but fuelling concerns about the ability of the European 
institutions and, in particular of the EMU, to survive. The TARGET2 claims accumulated by the 
national central banks of the core countries on the ECB are related to the financial liabilities 
accumulated by these authorities with respect to their domestic financial institutions. In a symmetrical 
manner, the TARGET2 liabilities accumulated by the national central banks of peripheral countries to 
the ECB are related to the financial claims these authorities accumulated with respect to their domestic 
financial institutions. Therefore, the deposits accumulated by the institutions of the core countries are 
counterbalanced by the loans accumulated by the institutions of the peripheral countries. As far as the 
latter are granted, according to the set of rules laid down by the decision-making bodies of the ECB 
and in particular within a prudent policy management of the credit risk, it is not reasonable to create 
prospective scenarios based on insolvency of the ECB. In order to argue that the accumulated 
TARGET2 claims result into an increase in the credit risk borne by the core countries, it is necessary to 
prove that it is more risky to have the Eurosystem as a counterpart than any financial institution of the 
peripheral countries. In other words, one should prove that the lending policy of the Eurosystem is 
more risky than that one implemented by the institutions of the peripheral countries. 27 From our point 
of view the core interpretation takes implicitly this position without demonstrating it. 28 
                                                 
27 Since the beginning of the debate on TARGET2 balances, this point has been clearly underlined by the ECB [8] (p. 40). 
28 In addition, assuming the insolvency of the Eurosystem means denying the possibility for the Eurosystem to create 
monetary base. Where the financial institutions of the core countries were to ask for the liquidation of the assets held at 
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As already stressed, the action of the ECB was necessary because the price system was unable to 
reflect correctly the economic fundamentals, but it was also necessary because the austerity policy and 
the structural reform were not effective in stabilizing the economy of the countries mostly hit by the 
crisis. Blanchard and Leigh [37] found that a tighter planned fiscal consolidation is associated with a 
level of actual GDP lower that the expected one; according to the authors, this result could stem from a 
strong underestimation of the fiscal multiplier. A vast amount of literature supports this last 
conclusion; Auerbach and Gorodnichenko [38] show that the value of the multiplier tends to be higher 
during the recessions and lower during the expansions. 
The theoretical analysis has identified several factors that could be held responsible for such a 
dynamic. A first explanation lies in a constant nominal rate of interest: in adopting a restrictive fiscal 
policy, the lower pressure on prices leads to a reduction in the nominal interest rate, stimulates the 
private components of the aggregate demand and mitigates the negative impact of the fiscal 
consolidation; however, when the nominal rate of interest is already close to zero such a mechanism 
cannot operate (Christiano et al. [39] and Eggertsson and Krugman [40]). Furthermore, if the adoption 
of a restrictive fiscal policy is coupled with a reduction in the private debt, the intensity of the 
recession might be such to generate a phenomenon of deflation and frustrates the efforts for stabilizing 
the debt made by the public administration through the fiscal consolidation and by the private sector 
(Eggertsson and Krugman [40]). A second explanation lies in the possible limited validity of the 
Ricardian equivalence: in adopting a restrictive fiscal policy, the lower expected tax burden can 
stimulate the private demand by limiting the negative impact of the fiscal consolidation; however, this 
mechanism would not operate at all if the economic agents are either characterized by a restricted time 
horizon or a rationed access to the credit market (Arestis [41]). 
The combination of the above-mentioned elements suggests that a restrictive fiscal policy can be 
inappropriate, at least in the short run, to stabilize the economy, by promoting an increase in the  
debt-to-GDP ratio and a decrease in the inflation rate. 29  Thus, this policy appears to be highly 
unsuitable in the resolution of the sovereign debt crisis, especially when it is implemented in the 
absence of an institution acting as a lender of last resort for the benefit of the peripheral countries. The 
ECB took this kind of responsibility through the OMTs, following the consequence of the implicit 
refusal of the European institutions to create a mechanism working as lender of last resort for the 
Eurozone member States. 
Nevertheless, the OMTs did not solve all troubles of the EMU; their introduction ensured financial 
markets against the risk of a new partial default regarding an EMU country but without determining a 
recovery in the economy. 30 Following the implementation of austerity measures, the main Euro area 
economies experienced a recession period and the inflation rate declined under the statutory target of 
                                                                                                                                                                       
the Eurosystem, this latter would merely accept that the monetary base, until then hold in its deposits, started to fuel the 
economic system. The only risk of this process, in the lack of a sterilization procedure, would be an increase in the price 
level with the corresponding reduction in the purchasing power (De Grauwe and Ji [11]). For a full discussion on this 
issue, see Buiter and Rahbari [36]. 
29 This conclusion is also confirmed by the European Commission [42]; see also Boussard et al. [43]. 
30 In fact, at the end of 2014, TARGET2 imbalances were higher than their pre-crisis level; but they could reflect both the 
ordinary working of a monetary union where some peripheral countries are experiencing a slower recovery compared to 
core countries and the contagion effect connected with the new Greek political crisis. However, this paper cannot face 
this issue because only during last months the recovery has been strengthening and the political crisis in Greece has 
been finding a solution. 
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the monetary policy. In January 2015, to face this situation the ECB Governing Council felt forced to 
launch an expanded Asset Purchase Programme that encompassed the Asset-Backed Securities 
Purchase Programme (ABSPP) along with the third Covered Bond Purchase Programme (CBPP3) 31 
and included the purchase of sovereign bonds issued by Euro area central governments, agencies and 
European institutions. For the countries under programme the eligibility was conditional to the 
respective programmes criteria. The purchase started in March 2015 and will last, at least, until 
September 2016 for a monthly amount of 60.0 billion euro; hypothetical losses related to the purchases 
of sovereign bonds will be imputed for a 20.0 per cent to the ECB and for the remaining 80.0 per cent 
to the national central banks. The main reason leading the Governing Council to launch these 
additional programmes was that the liquidity injected into the economy through the previous  
non-standard measures was significantly lower than expected with the risk of triggering an intense 
deflationary process (ECB [44]). 32 The effect of the actions taken by the ECB is still significantly 
uncertain as they will be able to stimulate the demand for consumer goods and investment of 
households and firms only to the extent that credit institutions will be able to transform the greater 
liquidity available in credit to non-financial sector. 
5. Conclusions 
This paper argues that the dynamics of the TARGET2 balances reveal important shortfalls in the 
European institutions’ choices when dealing with the sovereign debt crisis rather than a balance-of 
payment crisis due to competitiveness disparities across Eurozone member States. In particular, these 
shortfalls stem from the implicit refusal to set up a mechanism or an institution to serve as a lender of 
last resort. 
To support this thesis, the following arguments have been made: (a) before the financial crisis, the 
peripheral countries presented various degree of heterogeneity when compared trough different macro 
indicators of internal and external performance; (b) a substantial outflow of central bank liquidity was 
observed in the peripheral countries in coincidence with specific policy decisions taken by the 
European institutions, involving a sharp deterioration of expectations about both the degree of 
solvency of countries belonging to the Euro area and the distribution of risks of a possible partial or 
total default; (c) the monetary policy decided and implemented by the ECB stemmed from its 
legitimate and unavoidable role of lender of last resort for credit institutions to avoid liquidity crisis; 
(d) austerity measures destabilized the economic system in the presence of strongly negative 
conjuncture and a monetary policy ineffective in reducing interest rates. 
These elements drew a picture that suggested the need for the creation of either an institution or a 
mechanism that could play the role of lender of last resort for supporting the peripheral countries. 
                                                 
31 The ABSPP and the CBPP3 started in November and October 2014, respectively. Their aim was to enhance the  
well-functioning of specific segments of the financial markets and to provide the non-financial corporation in the Euro 
area with an easier access to credit. 
32 In 2014, the Eurosystem implemented also the Targeted Longer-Term Refinancing Operations (TLTROs), that is, 
refinancing operations which can be accessible by the financial institution only if they provide the non-financial sector 
with loans (except for loans granted to households for house purchase). The TLTROs revealed somewhat disappointing: 
compared with a maximum limit of loans of approximately 400 billion euro, credit institutions requested and obtained 
loans for a total of just 212.1 billion euro; a sign of how the recession induced by the austerity measures weakened the 
credit demand by households and businesses. 
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Indeed, only when the ECB took this responsibility by launching the OMTs’ clear signs of 
improvement were observed in the sovereign debt crisis. The dynamics of the TARGET2 system 
balances were determined by obvious tensions in financial markets due to a crisis of confidence in the 
ability of the EMU to survive; nevertheless, this crisis of confidence was not the result of a historical 
accident but was a direct consequence of the implicit refusal of the European institutions to create a 
mechanism that would serve as a lender of last resort for EMU member States. 
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Appendix 
Table A1. Macro indicators of internal and external performance. 
Variable 1. Real GDP Rate of Growth 2. Value Added Industry 3. Value Added Construction 4. Value Added Trade 5. Value Added Financial Services 6. Value Added Real Estate 
Member 
State/Time 
Average 1999–2007 Average 1999–2007 Average 1999–2007 Average 1999–2007 Average 1999–2007 Average 1999–2007 
Germany 1.6 25.6 4.4 16.3 4.9 11.2 
Ireland 6.4 26.7 8.3 16.5 8.7 7.0 
Greece 4.0 13.6 7.7 25.9 4.4 11.7 
Spain 3.9 19.5 10.9 23.2 4.8 7.1 
Italy 1.5 21.1 5.4 21.1 5.0 11.3 
Portugal 1.8 18.9 7.2 22.5 6.6 8.2 
Variable 7. Deficit/Surplus-to-GDP-ratio 8. Debt-to-GDP ratio 9. Debt-to-GDP ratio 10. Debt-to-GDP ratio 
Member 
State/Time 
Average 1999–2007 1999 Average 1999–2007 
Average rate of change  
1999–2007 
Germany −2.2 60.2 62.4 0.8 
Ireland 1.6 46.7 31.1 −7.9 
Greece NA NA NA   
Spain 0.2 60.9 48.2 −6.1 
Italy −2.9 109.6 102.9 −1.2 
Portugal −4.3 51.0 59.6 3.2 
Variable 11. Net current account 12. Net good and services 13. Export 14. Import 15. Net income 16. Net current transfers 
Member 
State/Time 
Average 1999–2007 Average 1999–2007 
Average rate of change 
1999–2007 
Average rate of change 
1999–2007 
Average 1999–2007 Average 1999–2007 
Germany 2.7 3.7 5.8 5.0 0.3 −1.3 
Ireland −1.6 13.1 −4.6 −3.2 −15.1 0.3 
Greece −7.9 −8.1 4.7 4.0 −2.1 2.3 
Spain −5.5 −3.6 −0.1 2.3 −1.8 −0.1 
Italy −0.5 0.6 1.9 3.7 −0.4 −0.6 
Portugal −9.3 −8.9 1.2 1.0 −2.5 2.1 
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Table A1. Cont. 
Variable 17. Net direct investment  
18. Net dividends and 
distributed branch profits
19. Net reinvesting 
earnings and 
undistributed  
branch profits 
20. Net income on  
debt (interest) 
21. Net portfolio investment 
22. Net current transfer 
general government 
Member 
State/Time 
Average 1999–2007 Average 1999–2007 Average 1999–2007 Average 1999–2007 Average 1999–2007 Average 1999–2007 
Ireland −17.1 −11.3 −6 0.4 0.9 −0.6 
Variable 23. Net IIP  24. Net IIP 25. Valuation effect 
26. Sovereign bond 
holding, resident 
27. Sovereign bond holding, 
resident 
28. Sovereign bond holding, 
resident 
Member 
State/Time 
1999 Average 1999–2007 Average 1999–2007 1999 2007 Average 1999–2007 
Germany 4.4 12.3 0.3 65% 53% 60% 
Ireland 49.4 −8.3 −4.5 45% 10% 25% 
Greece −29.3 −59.2 −4.9 66% 29% 51% 
Spain −31.3 −47.5 −3.9 69% 50% 55% 
Italy −4.8 −13.7 −3.2 68% 51% 58% 
Portugal −31.2 −57.6 −0.9 46% 24% 32% 
Note: 1. Gross Domestic Product at 2010 reference level, annual percentage change, source: European Commission AMECO database (code OVGD); 2–6. Gross Value 
Added by industry breakdown, percentage of total, source: Eurostat (code nama_10_a10); 7. General Government deficit/surplus in percentage of GDP, source:  
Eurostat (code gov_10dd_edpt1) used for the macro imbalance procedure of the European Commission; 8–10. General Government gross debt consolidated in percentage 
of GDP, source: Eurostat (code tipso10) used for the macro imbalance procedure of the European Commission; 11–16. BOP current account and its main component 
towards the rest of the world, expressed in net terms (with the exception of import and exports) and in percentage of GDP, source: Eurostat (code bop_q_c);  
17–22. BOP income and current transfers subcomponents towards the rest of the world, expressed in net terms and in percentage of GDP, source:  
Eurostat (code bop_q_c); 23–24. Net International Investment Position towards the rest of the world, expressed in percentage of GDP, source:  
Eurostat (code bop_ext_intpos); 25. Valuation effect of the changes (y-o-y) in net International Investment Position expressed as percentage of GDP, source: authors’ 
calculations on Eurostat data (code bop_ext_intpos); 26–28. Sovereign bond held by resident expressed as percentage of the total, source: “Bruegel dataset on sovereign 
bond holdings”. All the variables expressed as percentage of GDP are calculated on the basis of the GDP, source: Eurostat nama_10_gdp.
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